INTRODUCTION
In 1807 the British Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone embarked on an unprecedented experiment in international humanitarian intervention under the auspices of its Chief Judge, Robert Thorpe. From the court's seat at Freetown, Thorpe authored and implemented a judicial policy that hastened the demise of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and challenged the principles of free navigation that remain the subject of fierce legal controversy to this day. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the British colony of Sierra Leone served as a naval base from which the Royal Navy aggressively intercepted and captured foreign vessels involved in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Thorpe's court adjudicated cases involving those captive ships and released their human cargo into the colony. The court ordered the release of so many captive Africans in Sierra Leone that, by 1850, approximately 40,000 freed slaves lived in the precincts of Freetown alone. ' This Note offers a historical narrative of this early and bold judicial experiment in humanitarian intervention. First, the Note will explain the role that British courts played as the enforcers of a nascent international legal norm prohibiting the slave trade. Second, in recounting Chief Judge Robert Thorpe's tenure on the court, it will offer a case study of judicial actors at the vanguard of social and legal change.' Third, it will present, for the first time, a full account of the direct historical context of the celebrated Le Louis case, which affirmed the principle that no state may board, search, or otherwise exercise jurisdiction over the ships of another state in peacetime.' Finally, it will discuss how the work of Thorpe's court relates to current challenges to the traditional law-of-the-sea regime governing freedom of navigation, paying particular attention to the challenges posed by the Proliferation Security Initiative.
reporting by the courts of vice admiralty was never formalized at all. Consequently, what records do survive from the vice admiralty courts are relatively few, dispersed, and incomplete. Scholars of the history of Sierra Leone appear to have overlooked the archival sources that constitute the core of this account: the correspondence and court records of the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone. 9 The British courts of vice admiralty were, by merit of their prize jurisdiction, uniquely situated to deal with politically sensitive legal questions. Prize cases-cases stemming from disputes over the wartime rights of neutrals and belligerents to engage in trade and transport by sea-were invariably shot through with political, diplomatic, and military considerations. These cases required a judge to be legally ambidextrous-to be as proficient in the laws of his home state as he was in treaty law and the law of nations, all the while bearing in mind the impact of his decisions on military and diplomatic affairs. Courts with prize jurisdiction sat at the intersection of wartime diplomacy and international law, and their judges (particularly Thorpe) were acutely aware of this fact. Consequently, British admiralty courts proved especially fruitful ground for the development of international public policy.
Part I of this Note will show how humanitarian and geopolitical imperatives forced the interests of private philanthropists and public officials to converge squarely on Freetown in 1807. In the process, this Part will explain how the American and French Revolutions led to Britain's abolition of the slave trade and the establishment of a colony at Sierra Leone. Part II will focus on the manner in which Chief Judge Robert Thorpe carved out a commanding legal regime from his humble Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone, attempting to make Great Britain the enforcer of a near-universal ban on the West African slave trade. Part II will also track the development of Thorpe's early experiment in humanitarian intervention through its almost eight-year duration (18o8-1815). Part III will then illustrate how diplomatic pressure led to the ultimate demise of Thorpe's tenure as Chief Judge of the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone -but not until after the pressure Thorpe exercised from the bench had helped set in motion the demise of the slave trade itself. Part IV will demonstrate how the reevaluation of the freedom of the seas regime that Thorpe helped precipitate has a modern parallel in the current 9. The Public Record Office (PRO) in London holds the correspondence between Chief Judge Thorpe and members of the British government, along with copies of ships' logs and case records. The files in London do not include all of the work undertaken by the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone, but they are sufficiently comprehensive to provide insights into its workings.
Proliferation Security Initiative, which seeks to constrain the seaborne trade in weapons of mass destruction.
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT
In order to understand the legal context in which Robert Thorpe presided over the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone, it is important to understand the historical context in which the colony itself was established. The origins of the Sierra Leone colony were bound up with the aspirations of British abolitionists -private individuals who strove to effect humanitarian change on an international scale. The first British settlement at Sierra Leone in 1782 was the culmination of what one historian has called "the great period of abolitionist euphoria." 1° The creation of a free territory on the slave coast of Africa, in which not only the trade in slaves but also the institution of slavery itself was forbidden, buoyed abolitionist hopes that a general ban on the slave trade in Britain would soon follow. Two sets of political pressures militated toward the fulfillment of this goal. The first was the problem of London's black poor, whose numbers had swelled with the arrival of black loyalists from North America in the wake of the American Revolution. The second was the shadow of Napoleon Bonaparte.
A. The Population Imperative
The first blacks who settled in the Sierra Leone colony were largely former slaves who had fought for the British (and had thus been freed) during the 11. Opposition to such a ban came largely from Bristol and Liverpool, port cities that had prospered from the "horrid trade." Yet public opinion, often intensified by evangelical zeal, overpowered the influence of the slave traders. When statistics on slave mortality rates and the brutal methods employed in the slave trade were presented to Parliament in 1792, public outcry reached new heights; and when slave traders protested that abolition vitiated the spirit of free-market capitalism, abolitionists replied that capitalism could never condone the treatment of human beings as chattel. (1973) . McManus also pointed out that some slaves found themselves able to negotiate the terms of their own sale, even to the extent that they were able to require that prospective buyers promise them manumission after a certain term of labor. Id. at 153-54.
13.
Christopher Back in London, he presented these plans to the Committee for the Black Poor. See FYFE, supra note 5, at 14-15. Suspicious as Smeathman's proposal was, it became all the more suspect when it was revealed not only that creditors were pursuing him, but that he was amenable to enslaving his prospective pioneers. BRAIDWOOD, supra note 12, at 83-94.
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The evangelical abolitionist Granville Sharp stepped forward, determined to effect this resettlement. Long a champion of the abolitionist cause, 7 Sharp envisioned a "Province of Freedom" in Africa for freed slaves and poor blacks. He won the support of the Clapham Sect, a group of prominent abolitionists that included Member of Parliament William Wilberforce 8 and the future Governor of Sierra Leone Zachary Macaulay. 1 9 The Committee also recruited Olaudah Equiano, an ardent abolitionist and former slave who had purchased his own liberty and who would later serve as commissary for the voyage to Africa. 2° With the financial backing of private donors and the support of the British Navy, Sharp and the Committee organized the first settlement expedition to Sierra Leone. In May 1787, 411 settlers arrived at the River Sierra Leone at the beginning of the malaria-and fever-ridden rainy season. , 1987) . Equiano discussed the episode in his autobiography, writing: Thus ended my part of the long-talked-of expedition to Sierra Leona; an expedition, which, however unfortunate in the event, was humane and politic in its design; nor was its failure owing to government; every thing was done on their part; but there was evidently sufficient mismanagement, attending the conduct and execution of it, to defeat its success.
Id. at 174.
21. BRAIDWOOD, supra note 12, at 181-85. The Temne did not consider this "purchase" a sale of property in the Western sense (i.e., involving an alienation of property rights in perpetuity). On the contrary, such arrangements were considered a form of tenancy in which the tribal landlord retained certain rights over the territory, including the ability to help himself to gifts from it and the right to mediate disputes among its inhabitants. 395-96 (1962) .
B. The Geopolitical Imperative
The young settlement at Sierra Leone attracted the attention of the British government with the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars. The English evangelicals who were preoccupied with the problem of London's black poor also saw a message from God emblazoned on the map of Europe in the form of Napoleon Bonaparte. They viewed the revolution in France and the ascendancy of Napoleon as divine punishment for Western Europe's sinful participation in the slave trade. 22 Whether or not Napoleon's forces represented the vengeful hand of God at work, two things quickly became clear to the British government. First, if Britain was to retain a foothold in West Africa, she needed to turn Sierra Leone into a crown colony. Second, the slave-trading ships based in Bristol and Liverpool would be far better utilized in the defense of British interests against Napoleon than in the traffic of human cargo.
By 1807, the privately sponsored humanitarian experiment at Sierra Leone was foundering. Attempts to establish local agriculture were failing, as were attempts to establish regular trade contacts with the colony's hinterlands. 23 Moreover, French raids laid waste to parts of the setdement, and the French fleet repeatedly destroyed supplies en route to the colony from England.' Facing the risk of losing a strategic naval base at Sierra Leone, along with the loss of the abolitionist cause in Africa altogether, the British government declared Sierra Leone a crown colony in August 1807. Westminster did have more pressing concerns. In order to confront Napoleon's fleet, it would have to muster all naval resources available. Banning British subjects from participating in the slave trade would free up many of the ships of Bristol and Liverpool, cities that had prospered from that trade. Thus was abolitionist zeal coupled with brute necessity to secure the passage of the 1807 Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade . 7 The Act forbade all British subjects throughout the United Kingdom and her colonies from buying, selling, transporting, or otherwise transferring ownership of slaves. Slaves could neither be transported into the Empire from Africa, nor traded among British subjects within the Empire. Furthermore, the Act prohibited British subjects from so much as outfitting a ship for the transport or trade of slaves, rendering all the trappings of such a voyage, from ship to shackles, confiscable by the government.
In 29. Service in the West Africa Squadron was often thankless work. Naval historian Leslie Gardiner has described it as a task force of out-of-date sloops and frigates, far from the limelight, from Their Lordships' notice and from the modest comforts of Channel or Mediterranean warships. This was the station to which the bad hats, the unfortunates and those without Interest were banished, to work out their penance and sacrifice their healths and tempers and drop far behind in the betting when the promotion lists were made up.
LESLIE GARDINER, THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY 218 (1968).
30.
Letters Patent Establishing a Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone, supra note 28. Further complicating these unique circumstances, Thorpe had little by way of institutional precedent on which to rely. He found the court in shambles: too corrupt, too disorganized, and too poorly staffed to enforce the abolition of the slave trade. Thorpe described the state of affairs upon his arrival in the colony as follows: "I found a Tradesman had nominally presided in this Court, he condemned, he purchased the Cargo and then retailed it, the precedents were erroneous, the officers insufficient and dissatisfied, and the practice indecorous, as there was no Salary every thing was slovenly...."34
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Moreover, Thorpe, apparently unlike his predecessor, was troubled by Westminster's vague instructions and repeatedly sought official approval for an expansive power to condemn slave ships. His requests for the clarification of his authority met with little cooperation. For example, in an 1812 letter to Lord Liverpool, an exasperated Thorpe asked for a clear mandate to condemn slave ships. He explained that he found the court's prize commission "inadequate to meet the various Cases that arose."" 5 What was the judge to do, for example, if a British ship captured a trading vessel outfitted with chains and shackles and all the trappings of the slave trade, but with no slaves on board? Were only the ships that were actually carrying slaves at the time of capture lawful prize? Notwithstanding the unclear mandate of his court's prize commission, Thorpe remained committed to using the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone to enforce the ban on the slave trade. He saw his court both as a judicial counterpart to the Royal Navy and as a powerful deterrent to would-be slave traders. So committed was he to this project that he assumed an informal prosecutorial role in the capture of ships in addition to his formal adjudicative finction. As Thorpe explained in one letter to London:
The Governor has had Information of some of His Majesty['s] subjects at Goree and in the Rio Pongus dealing in Slaves [of] late, if we can bring them within reach of the Law, it will have an excellent effect, they are rich and highly considered. I caused to be arrested one of the greatest American Slave Traders, he carried off many of His Majesty's subjects which he now holds in Slavery, on his Plantation in America, we have much Testimony to collect, and if we make a complete example of this fellow, it will alarm the American Factors widely and put many to flight, it is wonderful what artful contrivances those wretches have to escape the Law and Our Ships of War .... "
Thorpe's eagerness to prosecute American slave traders is particularly striking. Although these traders were acting in contravention of an 1807 act of the U.S. Congress banning the slave trade, 8 they were captured beyond what would, at least in the abstract, be considered the territorial waters of Sierra Leone. At that time, Goree was Portuguese-controlled, and the Rio Pongo was populated largely by Portuguese and Spanish slave factors 39 who operated 36. Id. For an example of the West Africa Squadron's activities, see infra notes 94-95.
Id.
38. Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (prohibiting the importation of slaves into any part or place within the jurisdiction of the United States after January 1, 18o8).
39. "Factors" were slave traders who set up grim posts known as factories on the inland coasts of Sierra Leone's rivers. "Factories took many forms," wrote historian Bruce L. Mouser, but usually consisted of living quarters above or adjoining the store, a warehouse, a barracoon to contain marketable slaves, a courtyard large enough to protect visiting caravans and their merchandise, and usually a wharf where visitors anchored their ships. Only the most wealthy could afford to fortify their factories independently of their respective governments. Britain made no claim to sovereignty over these areas, but her Navy did not shy away from capturing slave ships thought to have kidnapped black settlers from Sierra Leone for the purposes of the slave trade. 40 This is precisely what happened in the Bixby case described by Governor William Maxwell in a letter to Lord Liverpool on May 8, 1812. The Royal Navy captured an American citizen by the name of Joseph Bixby (alternately called Biseby in the letter) on the Rio Pongo; he was subsequently convicted in Sierra Leone of kidnapping two boys from the colony and selling them into slavery. 41 Maxwell had him imprisoned and, pending Westminster's decision, committed to the custody of Lieutenant Mitchener of the H.M.S. Protector. 42 Cases of this kind appear to have arisen with some frequency in Thorpe's first four years in Sierra Leone. He noted in exasperation in 1812 that "the Americans swarm on the Coast, their Factors and Agents are evidently spread, and with Spanish or Portuguese Flags, papers and citizenships they still carry on the Slave Trade extensively. 41 Engaging in an illegal slave trade under false colors posed a particularly vexing problem to Thorpe, for Portugal retained some rights -the precise extent of which were unclear-to the African slave trade under its 18lo treaty with Britain. Under this treaty, Britain agreed that Portuguese slave ships originating from that state's African dominions would be exempt from capture by British ships. 44 However, the actual boundaries of colonial territories were with cannon purchased from visitors' ships. Others salvaged cannon from shipwrecks, which occurred frequently along the coast. Although Westminster was determined that the British Navy should give vigorous effect to the abolition of the slave trade, it did not give clear guidance to the courts of vice admiralty on how to deal with the legal fallout of this policy. When Thorpe requested that his judicial superiors in England advise him on how to approach cases in which Spanish-and Portuguese-flagged ships had been captured while carrying on an illicit American slave trade, Sir William Scott, Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, offered the following stultifying reply:
[I]t would be particularly Improper for me to furnish the Instructions required, as being the person to whom the Appeal immediately lies, and whose duty it will be to examine these Cases when they come regularly before me with all the Evidence that properly belonged to them, the only Instruction which I should presume to give is that [you] must obey Acts of Parliament and respect Treaties; but that if they should unfortunately Clash, the Obligations of the Treaties will merit . . . particular Attention." 3 A charitable interpretation of this response would attribute to Justice Scott a profound appreciation of judicial due process. The more likely explanation is that he was content to leave the problem to be handled by a lower court judge. Indeed, Scott commented that Thorpe would have to "find his own way in the construction and application of the Law, and if he happens to mistake it, his mistakes must be corrected by the Court of Appeal to which he is subject, and from whose decisions he is to draw his Instruction for his future Judicial conduct." s4 On a more fundamental level, Scott's reply points to a unique attribute of prize jurisdiction: the convergence of executive and judicial authority." 5 On one hand, this split personality could allow for tremendous efficacy in enforcing international obligations. On the other, it could just as easily allow for spectacular abuses, as will be discussed in Part III.
B. Thorpe's Theory of Prize Jurisdiction over Slave Ships
Left to his own devices in formulating a policy toward the adjudication of captured slaving vessels brought into his court, Thorpe turned to three bodies of law in order to cobble together a rationale that would support the condemnation of these ships as lawful prize. The first was the law of Great Britain; the second, treaty law; and the third, "justice, humanity, [and] policy. ' Thorpe's policy may seem bold, if not altogether revolutionary. But when read in the context of British antislavery law, it was a logical continuation of the judgment of Lord Mansfield in the 1772 case of Somerset v. Stewart." s That judgment had the much-celebrated (and excoriated) effect of abolishing slavery on English soil. However, the exact text of the judgment was more limited in scope, holding only that slavery "is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law." 9 That is, in the absence of any positive law in Britain permitting slavery, any slave brought onto English soil was to be considered free. In the absence of such domestic laws, the British government was not bound to execute the positive laws of any other jurisdiction (in the Somerset case, Virginia) to enforce the master-slave relationship. The holding did not rule out the possibility that slavery might someday be legislated into existence in Britain, but it was received by British slaveholders and abolitionists alike as dealing a deathblow to the institution in their country. There is a certain intellectual symmetry between the Somerset ruling and the judicial policy articulated by Thorpe, for underlying both is the assumption that the laws of nature prohibit slavery. 6 Slavery has been attended in different countries with circumstances so various, as to render it difficult to give a general description of it. The Roman lawyer... calls slavery, a constitution of the law of nations, by which one is made subject to another contrary to nature. But this, as has been often observed by the commentators, is mistaking the law, by which slavery is constituted, for slavery itself, the cause for the effect; though it must be confessed, that the latter part of the definition obscurely hints at the nature of slavery. 6 "
The "Roman lawyer" to whom Hargrave referred is the Digest ofJustinian, the legal text from which most early-modern writers on the law of nations derived their conceptions of natural right. 6 4 What is most striking about the passage Hargrave cited is that the Digest emphatically asserts that slavery is contrary to the law of nature. 6 " According to the Digest, slavery is instituted by the law of nations, defined by Grotius as "the law which has received its obligatory force from the will of all nations, or of many nations., 66 This tradition holds that because the law of nations is based on custom and practice, its content is mutable over time and distance; the law of nature, being universal and eternal, is immutable. Consequently, slavery was not, as many Scholastic writers asserted, consistent with nature, 6 z but was a positive state imposed from without. 68 Turning to the writings of Bodin, Gentili, Pufendorf, Locke, and 
PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 94-101 (1999).
65. DIG. 1.5.4.1. (Florentinus, De Statu Hominum) (stating "Seruitus est constitutio iuris gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subicitur," or "Slavery is an institution of jus gentium, whereby one is subjected to the ownership of another contrary to nature" (translation by the author)). Huber, 6 ' Hargrave argued that the right to enslave peoples was historically derived from the practice of states rather than from natural right, thereby showing that this "most pernicious institution" 7 could only find legitimacy in the positive laws and practices of states. 7 1
2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES [OF THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, IN
C. The Geographic Scope of the Court's Jurisdiction
With this juridical tradition as support, Thorpe laid out the parameters of the West Africa Squadron's policy of coercive abolition. First, only nationals of states that had passed statutes legalizing the slave trade-statutes whose legitimacy Britain recognized through bilateral treaties with the states themselves -could participate in the African slave trade. Second, any Europeans found trading in slaves in an African territory not under the dominion of their home state would be fair game for capture by the Royal Navy or British privateers. The reasoning was that, in the absence of European dominion over such territory, the laws of nature would proscribe slavery there by default. It is notable that Thorpe did not entertain the possibility that some of the territories in which the slave trade occurred were within the dominion of indigenous peoples, and that their historical practices might therefore be a legitimate source of title to slaves. Thorpe's silence on this point is telling because conceding it would have laid bare a troubling fact: The slave trade was undertaken by Europeans and Americans with the cooperation of local African groups. Moreover, this concession would have undermined Britain's pretenses of acting as the strong arm of the abolitionist cause, because such a concession would have required an enormous exertion of military force on the continent of Africa itself.
The reach of the Sierra Leone prize court would therefore extend as far as the illicit European trade in slaves. According to Thorpe, this trade was indeed widespread:
[I]n the Rio Pongus those Renegade Factors, who a few months since renounced Slave trading, are still supplying those fast-sailing Ships and Schooners that come under Spanish Colours & American Navigators & which it involves all the issue in the misfortune of the parent. In truth, as I have already hinted, the variety of forms, in which slavery appears, makes it almost impossible to convey a just notion of it in the way of definition. who proceed with such alertness that this Cargo will be landed and the Slaves put on board in Forty eight hours .... "
The geographical extent of the trade that Thorpe deemed illegal was vast, comprising approximately 2500 kilometers of coastline. Thorpe fixed these boundaries with the imperial constitution in mind. European powers, he argued, could trade in slaves only on soil within their dominions (i.e., colonies) and only when Britain had acknowledged the parent state's right to engage in such trade by treaty. At the time Thorpe sat on the bench, the only West African territory that could properly be called a European colony was Angola. Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and Danish trading stations dotted the West African coast, but none of these were colonies. As one historian has explained, "in the period of the slave trade, Europeans did not appear in West Africa north of the equator as invaders or masters, but as equal trading partners." 73 Thorpe was determined to put an end to the illicit trade in slaves, whether undertaken by equal trading partners or not. The prize court at Freetown was to be the place of reckoning.
III. DEALING A DEATH BLOW TO THE EUROPEAN SLAVE TRADE
The task that Judge Thorpe undertook was Herculean: He sought to enforce unilaterally a universal ban on the slave trade. Moreover, Thorpe sought to do this without a clear mandate from his Government, relying instead on a legal tradition favorable to his cause and on humanitarian principles that he viewed as moral imperatives. This Part will show how Thorpe's ideals fared when they encountered the harsh realities of life in Sierra Leone: a self-interested merchant community, the need for cheap and abundant labor, and a system of government-sponsored incentives for abolitionism that yielded perverse results. This Part will culminate in an analysis of the diplomatic and legal crisis that Thorpe 
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A. British Abolitionism Becomes Lucrative
Following the British prohibition of the slave trade in 1807, Westminster established powerful incentives for the enterprising British privateer to take up the cause of abolitionism, regardless of the depth of his convictions. On May 16, 18o8, one year after the vice-admiralty court was established at Freetown, the King issued an Order in Council offering a bounty for captured slaves of £40 per man, £30 per woman, and £io per child, in lieu of prize money for the ship itself. 74 While the condemned slave ship and its fittings would become the property of the British government, a generous bounty would be paid to the captors for its human cargo. According to one historian, " [b] Thorpe, who grew increasingly disenchanted with the ends to which Freetown's political magnates were directing his judicial labors. 8 0 The governors of Sierra Leone were not particularly renowned for the depth of their humanitarian commitment., In fact, many were motivated more by profit than compassion in their abolitionist efforts. Zachary Macaulay, called "the great shopkeeper of the colony" by Thorpe, 2 appears to have presided over a price-fixing racket of sorts at Freetown, even acting as agent for the captors of slave ships in the vice-admiralty court at Freetown." 3 As mentioned above, condemned ships and their fittings became the property of the Crown. 8 4 They would most often be auctioned off at Freetown to the highest bidders and re-registered as British ships. 8s It appears that a circle of the colony's most prominent merchants conspired together to depress the value of bids so as to enable one another to purchase confiscated goods at belowmarket prices for subsequent resale. 8 Meeting the demand for low-cost merchandise required a steady supply of captured ships, which the more unscrupulous of Sierra Leone's colonial governors were happy to procure. Governor Maxwell, for example, aggressively deployed ships to despoil slave factories in the estuaries of the Sierra Leone River. s7 An 1815 memorial addressed to the Privy Council on behalf of a group of Havana-based Spanish ship owners spoke of one stunning foray:
[T]he late Governor William Maxwell Esquire thought fit to dispatch an armed expedition against the Settlement of Cape Mesurado (distant upwards of two hundred miles from Sierra Leone) which seized at that place Property to a large amount, in Ships merchandize and Slaves, this being taken to Sierra Leone was there condemned, as like matter of course . . . and the Owners of the Factories sent to Sierra Leone, imprisoned and sentenced by this all-condemning Tribunal to fourteen years transportation [in New South Wales].S8
Aggressive interceptions of slave ships by both the Royal Navy and privateers became the norm along the West African coast. Sometimes these interceptions occurred indiscriminately. The same memorial speaks of an expedition deployed by Governor Maxwell to distant Spanish settlements along the Rio Nufiez and Rio Pongo for the purpose of despoiling the slave factories there. The expedition returned to Sierra Leone with three Spanish ships, their human and chattel cargo, and ivory, cotton, and other merchandise valued at over £1o,ooo. In addition, the expedition arrested three white men, including one Spaniard and one American. 9 The men were tried at Sierra Leone in April of 1814, while Thorpe was visiting London in order to air his grievances over the governance of the colony. 9° Governor Maxwell had appointed a friend of his, Dr. Robert Purdie, the Colonial Surgeon, to act as Chief Judge in Thorpe's stead. 91 The three accused remained in prison for seven months before being sent to Portsmouth, England, where they were supposed to board a ship for the penal colony at Botany Bay, Australia. Luckily for the convicts, they arrived at Portsmouth just after the ship bound for Botany Bay had departed. Through an agent, they appealed their sentences to the Prince Regent 92 in Council (i.e., the Privy Council), who released them from the sentence imposed by the court in Sierra Leone. 93 The Council gave no further explanation for its decision. However, because the appellants do not appear to have sought compensation for their financial losses, it is quite likely that the Council did not see any use in detaining them further. In fact, prolonging their detention would have only been likely to incur the anger of diplomatic officials from Spain and the United States. Besides, by then the Privy Council had bigger problems brewing.
B. Toward a Diplomatic Crisis
Once legally consecrated by Thorpe, the vigor with which British ships captured foreign slavers triggered a diplomatic crisis between Spain and Britain. Under Thorpe's legal formulation, any West African territory or waterway not within the dominion of a power authorized by treaty to carry on the slave trade was fair game for incursion by British naval vessels and privateers. This included the Rio Nufiez and Rio Pongo, along which Spanish slavers were particularly active. As British incursions into these areas increased in number and intensity, Spanish merchants and the Spanish government alike plan: exalted as the freest spot on earth, to enlighten benighted Africa; and displayed to the world as the finest example of British liberty, and British philanthropy!!! Thus the abolition Act is to give us slaves without purchase, by seizing them from our allies; and then the framers of this magical act (which is to free and enslave at the same moment), acknowledge, that they look forward to its removing many objections to our purchasing Africans, for the same avowed and specific purpose ourselves! THORPE, supra note 26, at 46-47.
91
. FYFE, supra note 5, at 120-21. began pressuring Westminster to intervene on their behalf. This pressure would force the British government to rethink the degree of judicial discretion it would allow Thorpe to exercise.
In January 1813, the Spanish Ship Juan set sail from Havana, Cuba for the western coast of Africa, bearing a cargo of dry goods. Her Havana-based owner, Don Luis Martinez, did not hear of her for eleven months. Finally, in November of 1813, one Bartholomew Maria Maestre returned to Havana from the Rio Pongo bearing news of the ship. On May 27, 1813, the deposition of the Juan's captain stated that the ship had been captured by an armed vessel under English Colours and carried into the port of Sierra Leone but [Maestre] did not know the name of the vessel which had made the said Capture, nor whether any proceedings had been instituted against the said Ship Juan in the Vice Admiralty Court of that Settlement... [ 
.]94
Archival documentation of this period from the Foreign Office indicates that Don Martinez's predicament was not unusual. In fact, the Juan was but one of over two hundred Spanish ships captured and condemned as prize at Freetown.
9 '
When the captive ships arrived at Freetown, their captains and masters were detained by British authorities. Unable to correspond with the ships' respective owners (or with anyone else, for that matter), they were left to languish in Freetown prisons until either released or condemned to transportation. Consequently, ship owners and investors might spend months waiting for any news of the fate of their vessels.
6 Such was the case of the Juan, whose master, Juan Jose Patrollo, was detained for almost a year before returning to Havana in July of 1814. When the owner of the Juan learned that his ship had been captured, he immediately filed a protest with Spanish government officials in Cuba, as did scores of other merchants and ship owners in Havana, the main hub of the Spanish slave trade to the New World. 98 In the vast majority of cases, the ship owners could not pursue formal appeals to the Lords Commissioners in London because their window of opportunity had closed. While some may never have had sufficient documentation to bring the claim in any event, others may have learned that their ships had been captured long after the expiration of the statutory period in which an appeal could be filed. 9 9 Because Spanish government officials could provide little relief to the Cuban merchants, the Governor of Havana authorized a meeting of the planters, merchants, and ship owners of the city "to consider of the proper measures to be taken to procure compensation for the ruinous losses to which they [had] thus been subjected." ' With the Governor's blessing, they resolved to employ an agent in London, William Page, to represent their claims before the Privy Council. Privy Councilors could negotiate directly with foreign governments for the release of ships, just as they could interpret treaties on a case-by-case basis, thus keeping the power to shape foreign relations at least nominally within the grasp of the King-in-Parliament. 0 1
Page presented a litany of complaints to the Council. Not only did he enumerate cases involving the seizure of ships and the indefinite detention of their captains, he attached to one memorial ten long pages of affidavits attesting to the destruction of factories along the Rio Pongo by British ships, which carried the slaves back to Freetown to cash in for bounty.' 0 2 Westminster could no longer turn a blind eye to events in Sierra Leone. On October 31, 1815, Christopher Robinson, a judge in the High Court of Admiralty and member of Doctors' Commons," 3 issued an advisory letter to 99. As Page's Memorial notes:
[T]he impossibility which the Captains experienced (being Strangers and surrounded by Enemies) of giving the requisite Security to obtain copies of the Proceedings, the period for entering Appeals, according to the Prize Act (namely twelve months and a day) elapsed in many cases, before the owners could even learn the fate of their ships .... 
Memorial of William
C. Le Louis in Context
It is in the context of this recalibration of British abolitionist policy that we can best understand one of the most celebrated cases heard in the Prize Court of Appeals," 0 9 the case of Le Louis, which affirmed the principle of free navigation in time of peace. However, it also articulated a sobering principle that warns those contemplating humanitarian intervention that "a nation is not justified in assuming rights that do not belong to her merely because she means to apply them to a laudable purpose; nor in setting out upon a moral crusade of converting other nations by acts of unlawful force."
110
While diplomatic and executive channels were fully engaged in resolving the Spanish and Portuguese claims, a public debate was raging over the likelihood of a revived French slave trade. The 1814 Treaty of Paris, which brought the Napoleonic Wars to a short-lived end, allowed France to keep the territories she had acquired in Senegal. This, combined with the 18ol revival of slavery by Napoleon, led to fears that France would become a great slaving power in West Africa. Therefore, Britain insisted on an additional protocol to the Treaty of Paris under which France agreed to end its slave trade within five years." At the time of the Treaty's conclusion, one British writer lamented the apparent hypocrisy of British policy toward France:
She has instituted courts for the purpose of confiscating slave ships,... she has condemned to the pains and penalties of felony every British subject... who shall be concerned in buying or selling slaves either in Asia or Africa... she has been employing her naval and military forces in destroying the very last strongholds of the slave trade... and [she] has branded and punished as felons of a high order the miscreants who had stained the British name by continuing to carry it on. And while she has done all this .. she coolly stipulates for the admission of the 1o9. The Prize Court of Appeals was a subcommittee of the Privy Council. It was the court of final appeal within the system of admiralty jurisdiction. Counting among their ranks some of the key architects of state policy, the Lords Commissioners were in a unique position to develop legal doctrines against the backdrop of diplomatic and military exigencies because, within the Council, judge and statesman were one and the same. For a discussion of this body in the nineteenth century, see ROSCOE, supra note 7, at 74-75. No matter how profound or sincere the convictions that may have motivated Britain's experiment in humanitarian intervention on the western coast of Africa, passion alone could not sustain it.
By 1815, the eight-year-long experiment was beginning to wind down, straining under the weight of French, Portuguese, and Spanish protests. The 1817 case of Le Louis," 3 adjudicated on appeal in the High Court of Admiralty, brought the experiment to its jurisprudential end. In 1816, the Queen Charlotte, a British ship, captured the French slave ship Le Louis near Cape Mesurado and brought her to the prize court at Freetown for adjudication. The ship was condemned by the court, but her owners appealed the decision to London. Judge William Scott decided the appeal with a degree of clarity and precision conspicuously absent from his advice to Thorpe on the matter five years before." 4 Judge Scott's ruling cut to the heart of the legal assumptions underpinning Britain's policy of intercepting and condemning slave ships. It held that, all states being sovereign and equal, all states have an equal right to the free navigation of the high seas. With the exception of the rights of war that permit belligerents to search neutral ships during wartime,"' no state could claim the right to interrupt foreign navigation. Scott therefore issued the following admonition to Britain: So long as your own security is not jeopardized by the slave trade, "you have no right to prevent a suspected injustice towards another by committing an actual injustice of your own. " , 6 He thus dealt a deathblow to Thorpe Portugal,11 and the Netherlands," 9 respectively, stipulated that nationals of each state party to the treaty would preside over the judicial proceedings. The commissions had no jurisdiction over the captain or crew of ships -only over the ships themselves and their cargo. Captain and crew would be turned over to the authorities of the states of which they were nationals. The decisions of the commissions would be final: No appeal would be allowed. Hence, the commissions were founded on and administered through the cooperative efforts of all of the states whose nationals were involved in the slave trade. 120
Thus, the bold unilateralism of the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone yielded to the conciliatory multilateralism of the negotiating tables of Europe and, ultimately, to the deliberations of mixed commissions the world over. Although Thorpe' s judicial experiment ended in 1815, he remained committed to the cause of abolitionism. Consistent in his principles, if not in the manner he considered fit to implement them, Thorpe returned to England in order to urge the British government to continue its campaign to end the slave trade through diplomatic channels. In this manner, the vision of one judge influenced the policies of a state, and, in turn, the policies of that state spread to many, thereby setting in motion Europe's abolition of the slave trade. 
SOME LEGAL PARALLELS
Although two centuries old, the lessons to be gleaned from the work of Chief Judge Thorpe at the Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone are relevant to contemporary problems in international law. The basic problem Thorpe faced was how to stop a trade in human chattel, notwithstanding the fact that it was protected in some cases by treaty and in others by principles of free navigation. How could a British naval vessel lawfully intercept a slave ship on the high seas and then bring it to a British court for condemnation as prize (1) in time of peace, and (2) when certain traders possessed a positive right to engage in the slave trade by treaty with England? To this question, Thorpe urged the following answer: Treat slave traders as hostes humani generis -the equivalent of pirates under international law-and leave them open to the same sort of treatment one would give such enemies of humankind. Slave ships could thus be intercepted and captured in any place and by any state." ' However, because other states did not agree that slave traders were hostes humani generis, Thorpe soon recognized the contradiction inherent in his attempt to enforce unilaterally against states a norm that only he and a community of abolitionists conceived of as universal.
There is a similar paradox inherent in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) today." Announced by President George W. Bush in 2003, the PSI is a multilateral attempt to curb the international trade in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their components through the interdiction of ships carrying on such trade. 23 The existing legal regime governing the high seas would seem to militate against the interdictions and confiscations under the PSI. Article lio of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea guarantees ships complete immunity from interference on the high seas unless there is a reasonable basis upon which to suspect that the ship is engaged in, inter alia, piracy or the slave trade.' 4 Yet nowhere does Article 11o allow for interference in the transport of noncontraband weapons, rendering it difficult for states to prevent weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists or rogue governments. Hence the question arises, on what legal grounds can states forcibly interdict ships suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction in order to prevent deadly goods from falling into the hands of dangerous people?
Although it took shape in negotiating rooms through a distinctly multilateral effort, the PSI has its origins in an episode that posed a direct legal challenge (much like those represented by Thorpe's prize cases) to the legal regime governing free navigation: the So-San incident. In December 2002, Spanish ships, working in conjunction with U.S. intelligence agencies, interdicted the So-San, a North Korean ship bound for Yemen. Buried under tons of bags of concrete, the interdicting forces found fifteen Scud missiles along with WMD components. In the absence of any treaties to the contrary, the trade in WMD is the formal equivalent of trade in any licit good. Consequently, the U.S. government was forced to permit the vessel and its cargo to complete its voyage. 129 The international community is only beginning to deal with the challenges to international security posed by a free trade in WMD. However, if the defiant and ultimately successful challenge that Robert Thorpe made to the slave trade is any indication of the course we ought to take, the possibility for constraint of this new deadly trade is promising.
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CONCLUSION
While Robert Thorpe quickly learned that he could not single-handedly enforce a universal ban on the slave trade from his humble bench at Freetown, he could and did help set into motion the political and diplomatic engines of change. By applying an expansive interpretation to prevailing treaty regimes and by drawing upon the traditions of natural law and liberty as received by British courts, Thorpe provided judicial consecration for the abolitionist spirit upon which the Sierra Leone Colony was founded. And when the colony's leading members began to subvert this spirit, Thorpe made himself the champion of Sierra Leone's recaptives and the scourge of Freetown's magnates.
Through his judicial decisions, he sought to bring an end to the odious commerce undertaken by Western Europe's slaving powers; through his letters and his pamphlets, he laid bare the hypocrisy of Freetown's leaders.
Cumulatively, Thorpe's efforts forced Britain to the point of diplomatic crisis. If Westminster was to quiet the clamor of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and Danes, it would have to replace its policy of benign neglect toward Sierra Leone with vigorous diplomacy. Thorpe's judicial experiment at Freetown thus brought the slave-trading powers of Europe to the negotiating table with Britain. The Court of Vice Admiralty at Sierra Leone served as a model for the Mixed Prize Commissions: international tribunals constituted by treaty for the adjudication and condemnation of ships involved in the slave trade. Thus did the unilateral claim asserted by one state (i.e., that the slave trade is unlawful) spread to a group of states, and subsequently enter into the body of general norms of international law. For what Thorpe could not bring to a grinding halt, he instead brought to a gradual end. This is a dynamic that is beginning to unfold in the case of the PSI today. Whether this multilateral effort will help to control the international traffic in WMD, however, remains to be seen.
